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CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES: GIVING TORT CLAIMANTS A 
VOICE IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY CASES 
ABSTRACT 
Over the years, tort claimants have increasingly appeared in the 
bankruptcies of corporate debtors. More so than other participants in 
bankruptcy proceedings, tort claimants are brought into this forum 
involuntarily. Unlike shareholders, lenders, or even the corporate debtor’s 
employees, tort claimants often do not choose to engage in commercial 
transactions with corporate debtors. Rather, their claims arise because the 
debtor has harmed them without their consent. To protect their interests, tort 
claimants often request that courts order the United States Trustee to appoint a 
creditors’ committee to represent them. Courts have been authorized to do so 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). While courts have the authority to form 
creditors’ committees for tort claimants, courts do not uniformly grant tort 
claimants’ requests. 
Through the lens of the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway, Ltd. 
bankruptcy case, this Comment argues that courts should form creditors’ 
committees for tort claimants when corporate debtors with tort liability file for 
bankruptcy. Four arguments support this proposition. First, there are strong 
policy reasons for forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants. Second, 
courts need to form creditors’ committees for tort claimants to ensure that tort 
claimants are guaranteed due process of the law. Third, forming creditors’ 
committees for tort claimants is consistent with the case law interpreting 11 
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2), the Bankruptcy Code section authorizing the formation of 
creditors’ committees. Finally, forming creditors’ committees for tort 
claimants can have practical significance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Comment argues that courts should form a creditors’ committee of tort 
claimants when a corporation with tort liability files for relief under chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).1 The Code currently authorizes courts to 
form one or more creditors’ committees to represent unsecured creditors.2 The 
Code gives these committees significant powers, including the ability to 
negotiate a plan of reorganization with the debtor3 and the ability to hire 
lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to represent the committee’s 
interests.4 
Although forming a creditors’ committee of tort victims is currently not 
commonplace, such committees need to be the norm, not the exception, in 
chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The reasons why tort claimants need their own 
creditors’ committee can be shown through the use of the following 
hypothetical. Imagine losing a relative or suffering a serious injury at the hands 
of a corporate tortfeasor. You desire compensation for your loss, but the 
corporation that has harmed you has filed for bankruptcy. To make matters 
worse, you find out that the corporation owes significant amounts of money to 
several other parties. These parties include sophisticated individuals and 
various companies that have voluntarily engaged in business with the corporate 
debtor, including the corporation’s employees, lending institutions, and 
suppliers. Some of these parties have secured claims so they will get paid in 
full before you are paid, even if the debtor cannot pay you after it has satisfied 
these debts. Others have positions on the unsecured creditors’ committee, 
which will be able to hire professionals on the debtor’s dime. Such 
professionals have the expertise and know-how to negotiate for better 
repayment options and other advantageous treatment on behalf of their clients. 
You have requested that the court appoint a creditors’ committee to represent 
you. However, there is the chance that the court may instead give you only a 
seat on the existing creditors’ committee, or may deny your request outright. 
This possibility is a problem because the existing committee is stacked with 
 
 1 Chapter 11 is used primarily for business debtors to reorganize and continue operations or sell the 
business as a going concern. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY  ¶ 1101.01 (Alan Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an opportunity for a debtor to reorganize 
its business or financial affairs or to engage in an orderly liquidation of its property either as a going concern 
or otherwise.”). 
 2 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 3 Id. § 1103(c)(3). 
 4 Id. § 1103(a) (giving creditors’ committees the ability to employ “one or more attorneys, accountants, 
or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee”). 
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individuals whose interests and even possible avenues for repayment are 
completely dissimilar from your own interests. 
This hypothetical reflects the real-life plight of tort claimants in the 
Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway, Ltd. (“MMA”) bankruptcy case. On 
July 6, 2013, a train owned by MMA broke free from a rail yard in Nantes, 
Quebec.5 At the time, the unmanned train was carrying about seventy-three 
tank cars filled with crude oil.6 Soon after breaking free, the train derailed and 
plowed into buildings in the nearby town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec.7 The 
ensuing fires burned for thirty-six hours and wreaked havoc in the town center, 
causing an estimated forty-seven deaths, countless other injuries, and leveling 
forty buildings.8 Given the extent of the devastation experienced by accident 
victims, news commentators have labeled the train crash the worst in North 
America in twenty years.9 
One month after the crash, MMA filed a voluntary petition for relief under 
chapter 11 of the Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Maine.10 Later the same month, the estates of some of the people killed in 
the train crash filed a motion to appoint a committee of creditors to represent 
the interests of the wrongful death and personal injury claimants.11 A few days 
later, the Quebec government, the town of Lac-Megantic, and the tort-victim’s 
class-action representatives filed a similar motion with the bankruptcy court.12 
The Chapter 11 Trustee13 opposed both of these motions.14 In his opinion, 
 
 5 Runaway Train Devastates Canadian Town, CNN (July 12, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
interactive/2013/07/world/canada-train-explosion/. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 David McLaughlin, Frederic Tomesco & Tiffany Kary, Montreal Maine Railway Files for Bankruptcy 
After Crash, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-
07/montreal-maine-railway-files-for-bankruptcy-after-crash.html (estimating $200 million in cleanup costs for 
the accident); Runaway Train Devastates Canadian Town, supra note 5. 
 9 Louise Egan & Tom Hals, Railway in Deadly Quebec Explosion Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 
7, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-train-montrealmaineatlantic-idUSBRE97614 
E20130807. 
 10 Bankruptcy Petition, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Aug. 7, 2013), 
ECF No. 1. 
 11 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, at 1, In re Montreal Me. 
& Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Aug. 22, 2013), ECF No. 76. 
 12 Motion of Informal Committee of Quebec Claimants for Appointment of Creditors’ Committee 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 1102(a)(2) at 1, 5–6, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 
(Bankr. D. Me. Aug. 30, 2013), ECF No. 127 [hereinafter Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment]. 
 13 In a railroad reorganization, a trustee is always appointed with input from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation. 11 U.S.C. § 1163 (2012). In a typical chapter 11 case, however, a chapter 11 trustee is not 
appointed, and the debtor serves as the debtor in possession, having the powers and duties of the chapter 11 
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appointing a creditors’ committee in the case would be wholly unnecessary.15 
However, the experience of tort claimants in other chapter 11 bankruptcy cases 
strongly contradicts the Chapter 11 Trustee’s skepticism. 
Tort claimants have faced harsh outcomes in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases 
when they do not have their own creditors’ committee. In In re Chrysler, LLC, 
more than 150 personal injury victims requested the bankruptcy court to 
appoint an official creditors’ committee of tort claimants.16 Instead of 
appointing a separate committee to represent the personal injury victims, the 
United States Trustee17 appointed one tort claimant and one asbestos claimant 
to an existing creditors’ committee.18 This creditors’ committee consisted 
primarily of parties who were interested in selling Chrysler’s property “free 
and clear” of tort liability.19 These creditors had negotiated a deal in which 
they would receive an ownership interest in the newly formed Chrysler 
entity.20 Eventually, these creditors prevailed over the tort claimants because 
Chrysler’s assets were sold free and clear of the existing tort claims against 
Chrysler.21 Chrysler provided virtually nothing to tort claimants who had 
 
trustee. Id. § 1107(a). In chapter 11 cases, a trustee may be appointed to administer the bankruptcy estate and 
operate the debtor’s business either for cause or if it is in the interest of creditors. Id. § 1104. 
 14 Trustee’s Consolidated Response to Motions for Appointment of Creditors’ Committee Filed by 
Certain Wrongful Death Claimants & the Informal Committee of Quebec Claimants at 1, In re Montreal Me. 
& Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Sept. 11, 2013), ECF No. 212. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Motion of Ad Hoc Committee of Consumer-Victims of Chrysler LLC for Appointment of Official 
Committee of Tort Claimants Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) at 2–3, In re Chrysler LLC, No. 09-50002 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2009), ECF No. 273 [hereinafter Chrysler Motion for Appointment]. 
 17 The United States Trustee serves as part of the U.S. Department of Justice and is charged with 
overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases and private trustees, including those appointed in chapter 11 
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012). In the context of chapter 11 cases, the United States Trustee is responsible 
for appointing all members of creditors’ and equity security holders’ committees. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1); see 
also In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 164 (E.D. Mich. 1997).  
 18 Motion of Ad Hoc Committee of Consumer Victims of General Motors for Appointment of Official 
Committee of Tort Claimants Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) at 5, In re Gen. Motors, Inc., No. 09-50026 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009), ECF No. 287 [hereinafter Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment]. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Under the terms of the deal, the U.S. Treasury would provide some of the funds to orchestrate the sale 
of Chrysler to Fiat, and in return, the U.S. Treasury, Fiat, a Canadian entity, and the United Auto Workers 
Union would receive ownership interests in the new Chrysler entity. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. 
Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom., Ind. 
State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). 
 21 See Order (I) Authorizing the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets Free & Clear of All 
Liens, Claims, Interests and Encumbrances, (II) Authorizing the Assumption & Assignment of Certain 
Executory Contracts & Unexpired Leases in Connection Therewith & Related Procedures, & (III) Granting 
Related Relief, In re Chrysler, LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), ECF No. 3232 [hereinafter 
Chrysler Order Authorizing Sale]; see also Master Transaction Agreement Among Fiat S.p.A., New Carco 
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prepetition claims against it.22 Similarly, in In re General Motors, Inc., when 
the court did not form a creditors’ committee to represent tort claimants, 
General Motors’ assets were sold free and clear of more than 300 tort claims.23 
In light of these problems, this Comment examines how and why creditors’ 
committees should be formed for tort claimants in chapter 11 bankruptcies. 
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of creditors’ 
committees for the purpose of showing that these committees have certain 
rights and powers which can be used to protect tort claimants’ interests. Part 
II.A argues that forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants is supported 
by public policy. Part II.B shows that such creditors’ committees are needed to 
guarantee tort claimants due process of the law. Part II.C demonstrates that 
forming committees of tort claimants is consistent with the case law addressing 
the statutory requirements for creditors’ committees. Finally, Part II.D 
contends that forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants is likely to have 
important practical significance. Thus, this Comment will show that courts 
should uniformly form creditors’ committees for tort claimants when a 
corporation with tort liability files for bankruptcy. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES 
This part of the Comment will describe why forming a creditors’ 
committee will protect tort claimants’ interests and how such committees can 
be formed. 
 
Acquisition LLC, Chrysler LLC and the Other Sellers Identified Herein (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Master 
Transaction Agreement], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-
programs/Documents/mta.pdf.  
 22 Under Chrysler’s plan of reorganization, the sole recovery for unsecured creditors was proceeds from 
litigation instituted against Daimler. Disclosure Statement with Respect to Second Amended Joint Plan of 
Liquidation of Debtors and Debtors in Possession, In re Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
22, 2010), ECF No. 6273; see also Order Confirming Second Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of Debtors 
and Debtors in Possession, as Modified, In re Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010), 
ECF No. 6875. The case against Daimler was subsequently dismissed, Liquidation Trust v. Daimler AG (In re 
Old Carco LLC), 435 B.R. 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), and the unsecured creditors of Chrysler received 
nothing under the plan of reorganization. Notice of Conclusion of Daimler Litigation & Treatment of the 
Daimler Fund Balance, In re Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2013), ECF No. 8198. 
 23 ‘New’ GM Agrees to Assume Future Liability Claims of ‘Old’ GM Products, CLAIMS JOURNAL (June 
29, 2009), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2009/06/29/101794.htm (noting that the “New GM,” 
the entity which purchased General Motors’ assets, will not assume liability for pending claims against the 
automaker and those claimants will still be forced to seek compensation from the “Old GM”); see also Gen. 
Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 2 (stating that just the ad hoc committee of tort claimants 
consisted of more than 300 tort claimants). 
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A. Advantages Afforded Debtors in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies 
Chapter 11 provides debtors significant powers, which can be used at the 
expense of a debtor’s creditors.24 Most importantly, the chapter 11 process 
allows the debtor to modify its obligations to creditors while allowing the 
debtor to continue operating its business or to sell its assets as a going 
concern.25 In a traditional chapter 11 bankruptcy, a debtor specifies how it 
plans to repay its debts by drafting a plan of reorganization.26 This plan is 
supposed to be drafted based on input from a debtor’s creditors.27 A debtor 
should take into account creditors’ input because a debtor’s reorganization plan 
is similar to a contract between a debtor and its creditors—the debtor’s 
obligations to pay its creditors are extinguished in exchange for what the 
creditors receive under the plan.28 
More recently, many corporate debtors have opted not to draft a 
reorganization plan. Instead, they use the chapter 11 process to marshal their 
assets in anticipation of selling all or a portion of the business as a going 
concern in a § 363 sale.29 This process is known as a § 363 sale because § 363 
of the Code gives a debtor the authority to sell assets outside the normal course 
of business and without a reorganization plan. 
Section 363 sales can impact tort claimants’ interests. The issue is that 11 
U.S.C. § 363(f) gives debtors the ability to sell their property to a buyer free 
and clear of “any interest in such property” under certain circumstances.30 
While the Code does not define the phrase “any interest in such property,” 
courts have interpreted this term broadly to include tort claims.31 When a 
 
 24 For example, in chapter 11 the debtor can modify the rights of creditors, obtain financing, recover 
transferred property, and avoid obligations incurred prior to the commencement of the case. 7 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1100.01. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. ¶ 1100.09. 
 27 Id. 
 28 WILLIAM L. NORTON III & ROGER G. JONES, NORTON CREDITORS’ RIGHTS HANDBOOK § 18:1 (2014). 
 29 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 363.02[3]. While the chapter 11 plan process allows the 
debtor to sell all or a portion of the business as a going concern, the debtor may prefer to use § 363 to sell all 
or part of the business outside of the plan process if, for example, the delays inherent to the plan process could 
result in squandering the value of the estate. Id. Section 363 can be used even if there is “no emergency 
requiring immediate action.” Id. 
 30 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). See generally Alla Raykin, Comment, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due 
Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91 (2012) (discussing the use of § 363 sales to expedite the bankruptcy 
process and some troubling implications for creditors’ due process rights).  
 31 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 297 B.R. 774, 780–81 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs’ 
personal injury claims are “interest(s) in such property” that debtor sold free and clear to defendant); Am. 
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purchaser acquires the debtor’s property free and clear of tort claims or any 
other interests, it gets a court order stating that it acquired the property free and 
clear of these interests.32 Purchasers want to obtain such a court order because 
they could use the court order in later disputes to show that they are not 
responsible for paying any of the debtor’s debts even though they acquired the 
debtor’s property.33 
Thus, § 363 sales can have important implications for tort claimants for at 
least two reasons. First, tort victims may not be able to recover anything from a 
purchaser if the purchaser acquires the debtor’s assets free and clear of tort 
claims. Second, if the debtor’s assets are sold free and clear of preexisting tort 
liability, tort claimants may only receive adequate compensation if the sales 
price is high enough to cover the debtor’s tort liability, since the purchaser may 
not be responsible for satisfying the debtor’s tort liability. As such, as in 
drafting a reorganization plan, tort claimants’ input is needed in § 363 sales 
because such sales affect how much tort claimants will recover for their claims 
against the debtor. 
B. Role of Creditors’ Committees 
Regardless of whether the debtor proceeds through the traditional plan 
process or sells a substantial portion of its assets through a § 363 sale, the main 
action for creditors is negotiating with the debtor. The creditors may have 
varying interests such as seeing the debtor emerge from bankruptcy as a going 
concern, maximizing the repayment of their debts, or gaining an equity stake in 
the reorganized company. The Code provides a voice for creditors in this 
process through the mandatory creation of at least one creditors’ committee.34 
 
Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 189–90 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) 
(holding 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) precludes tort claimants from asserting their claims against the purchaser who 
bought the debtor’s assets free and clear of any interest in the debtor’s property). 
 32 See Felton E. Parrish et al., Sales of Assets Under Section 363, in 1-3 COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11: 
KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES ¶ 3.02 (Alan Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2014). 
 33 See id. The court order differentiates the § 363 sale from a sale under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which 
requires the purchaser to defend against successor liability using arguments based in state law. Id.; see Morgan 
Olson L.L.C. v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 467 B.R. 694, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Section 
363(f) ‘can be used to sell property free and clear of claims that could otherwise be assertable against the buyer 
of the assets under the common law doctrine of successor liability.’” (quoting George W. Kuney, 
Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 235, 267 (2002)). 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2). 
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Creditors’ committees represent the interests of the unsecured creditors 
and, if necessary, the equity security holders.35 The creditors’ committee 
generally consists of the holders of the seven largest unsecured claimholders, 
although the committee may be larger in large corporate bankruptcies.36 The 
committee members are appointed by the United States Trustee.37 The United 
States Trustee must appoint at least one creditors’ committee and has the 
authority to appoint additional committees.38 The court can also order that the 
United States Trustee appoint additional committees, if requested by a “party 
in interest.”39 
The purpose of a creditors’ committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of 
the larger body of creditors which it represents, either unsecured creditors or 
equity security holders.40 In chapter 11 bankruptcies, a watchdog is needed 
because, unlike in chapters 7 and 13, the debtor is permitted to act as its own 
trustee when it files for bankruptcy.41 Because a disinterested trustee will not 
be appointed in a typical chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the creditors’ committee 
is specifically responsible for monitoring the debtor’s operations and activities, 
and monitoring the debtor’s compliance with the requirements of the Code.42 
As part of its monitoring responsibilities, creditors’ committees have 
several duties and powers. These powers and duties are described in § 1103 of 
the Code.43 Section 1103(a) gives creditors’ committees the ability to employ 
“one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform 
services for [the] committee.”44 
 
 35 Id. § 1102(a)(1); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1102.03 (discussing the requirements for 
appointing a committee of equity security holders). 
 36 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1102.02[2]. The Enron 
committee had thirteen members; and the Chrysler committee had eleven members. In re Enron, 279 B.R. 671 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); Appointment of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re Chrysler LLC, No. 
09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009), ECF No. 366. 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. § 1102(a)(2). 
 40 Advisory Comm. of Major Funding Corp. v. Sommers (In re Advisory Comm. of Major Funding 
Corp.), 109 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Creditor Committees have the responsibility to protect the interest 
of the creditors; in essence, ‘the function of a creditors’ committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the 
larger body of creditors which it represents.’” (quoting AKF Foods, Inc., 36 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1984))). 
 41 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108 (describing the powers and duties of the debtor in possession in 
chapter 11), with id. §§ 701–702, 1302 (describing the powers of the trustee in chapters 7 and 13). 
 42 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 648 (2015). 
 43 11 U.S.C. § 1103; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.01.  
 44 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
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Section 1103(c) lists other powers that creditors’ committees possess.45 
These powers are tools to protect their constituency’s financial interests. Of the 
powers in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c), the committee’s ability to participate in the 
formulation of a reorganization plan is probably the most important.46 Having 
the ability to participate in the drafting of a reorganization plan is critical 
because committee members may be able to consult and negotiate with the 
debtor before the debtor submits its plan to the court.47 However, if specific 
requirements are met, the Code does permit the court to confirm reorganization 
plans even if some creditors do not approve of the plan.48 Similarly, the ability 
to investigate the debtor’s business, another power imbedded in § 1103(c), is 
important because a creditors’ committee may be able to better analyze how 
the debtor should reorganize its business and repay creditors after reviewing 
the debtors’ business records.49 Finally, because creditors’ committees may 
“perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented,” 
creditors’ committees can object to the allowance of other creditors’ claims.50 
If these claims are not allowed, the return of all other creditors will be 
increased because the debtor will have fewer claims to repay.51 
While 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) states that a committee “may” use those powers, 
the members of a committee have a duty to act in the best interests of their 
constituents so they will be required to exercise such powers if doing so is 
necessary to protect their constituents’ interests.52 Creditors’ committees are 
supposed to use their significant powers to act in the best interests of the 
creditors which they represent.53 For example, committee members cannot use 
their powers to advance the interests of any individual member of the 
committee over other members.54 Committee members are also required to 
 
 45 See id. § 1103(c). 
 46 Id.; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05.  
 47 But see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05[1][d] (“Nothing precludes the debtor 
from filing a plan without committee support, but a debtor should always negotiate with the committees and 
attempt to obtain their support.”). 
 48 This process is known as cramdown, and it allows a court to approve a reorganization plan as long as 
all classes of creditors that vote against the plan receive at least as much as they would have in a chapter 7 
liquidation and they are either paid in full or any junior claimholders will receive nothing under the plan. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (b). 
 49 See id. ¶ 1103.05[1][c]. 
 50 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5); see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05. 
 51 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05[1][f]. 
 52 Id. ¶ 1103.05.  
 53 Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 256 (3d Cir. 2001); see 7 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05. 
 54 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy, supra note 42, § 648. 
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deal fairly with creditors of the class that they represent.55 However, in 
practice, committee members may be incapable of fulfilling their fiduciary 
duties because their interests may be opposed to other committee members’ 
interests. 
Consider the interests of the various creditors in the MMA bankruptcy 
case. By far, the largest number of creditors in the MMA bankruptcy case were 
trade creditors.56 Trade creditors may have different interests than tort 
claimants.57 Trade creditors may be willing to forgo full repayment of their 
claims to help ensure that the debtor survives bankruptcy.58 Trade creditors 
may want the debtor to be operating after the bankruptcy proceedings are 
concluded so that the trade creditors can continue to sell goods and services to 
the debtor.59 However, tort creditors will likely have no interest in continued 
interactions with the debtor and they are more likely to have an immediate 
need for funds than trade creditors since the debtor has already injured them by 
causing damage to their physical health or personal property.60 Thus, trade 
creditors and tort claimants may be unable to serve as fiduciaries for each 
other. A potential solution to this problem is to appoint an additional creditors’ 
committee to represent only tort claimants. 
C. Forming Creditors’ Committees 
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) provides that creditors’ committees can be formed for 
unsecured creditors and equity security holders.61 Tort claimants may be 
appointed to such committees because tort claimants are unsecured creditors in 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 10. 
 57 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that persons with 
contingent claims are eligible to serve on creditors’ committees), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. 
Mich. 1997) (reversing the bankruptcy court to the extent it exceeded its authority by removing members of 
the creditors’ committee). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 7 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 403, 403–04 (2005). In the situation of mass tort liability that may manifest in the future, such as asbestos 
exposure, potential claimants may be interested in having funds set aside to cover future claims. Id. These 
types of tort claims may more closely resemble those of trade creditors, in that they have an interest in the 
future availability of funds and the long-term wellbeing of the debtor.  
 61 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2012) (providing for the formation of a “committee of creditors holding 
unsecured claims . . . or equity security holders”); In re Barneys, Inc., 197 B.R. 431, 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (“All creditors holding unsecured claims are eligible for committee membership.”); In re First 
RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (stating to be eligible for membership on a 
statutory committee, an entity must hold an unsecured prepetition claim). 
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bankruptcy proceedings.62 A creditor is an individual or business that has “a 
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for 
relief.”63 A claim covers all legal or equitable rights to payment even if they 
are unliquidated, unmatured, contingent, or disputed.64 Therefore, even though 
a tort claim may be disputed and unliquidated, it still meets the definition for a 
claim under the Code. Furthermore, as unsecured claimants, tort creditors are 
eligible to serve on the creditors’ committee. The difference between 
unsecured and secured creditors is that secured creditors have an interest that is 
backed not only by a debtor’s promise or obligation to pay but also by a second 
contract in which the debtor has committed specific assets to the creditor as 
collateral, which the creditor can seize if the debtor fails to honor its promise to 
pay.65 A tort claimant satisfies all the conditions for serving on the creditors’ 
committee because she has a claim against the debtor for the injuries that it 
inflicted upon her prior to bankruptcy and which is not secured by any 
collateral.66 Thus, tort claimants may be appointed to a creditors’ committee. 
Section 1102(a) of the Code gives the United States Trustee67 and the 
courts the responsibility for forming creditors’ committees.68 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1102(a)(1) requires the United States Trustee to appoint at least one 
creditors’ committee.69 The Code states that “the United States trustee shall 
appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims” as soon as 
practical after the beginning of a chapter 11 case.70 In contrast, the Code gives 
the United States Trustee the discretion to appoint additional creditors’ 
committees if he deems them appropriate.71 The Code states that the United 
States Trustee “may appoint additional committees of creditors . . . as the 
 
 62 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 65 B.R. 160, 161 (E.D. Va. 1986); In re Farm Bureau  Servs. Inc., 32 B.R. 
69, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982). 
 63 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). 
 64 Id. § 101(5). 
 65 PAUL BARRON & MARK B. WESSMAN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 4 (2d ed. 
2011). 
 66 But see Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy 
Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1297, 
1305–06 (1983) (explaining that a tort victim could make himself a secured creditor if, before the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy, the tort victim got a final judgment against the debtor and levied immediately upon the 
debtor’s assets that were not subject to any prior security interests). 
 67 See supra note 17. 
 68 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2). 
 69 Id. § 1102(a)(1), (3) (requiring the United States Trustee to form a creditors’ committee in a chapter 11 
bankruptcy case except in a small business case in which there is cause not to form a creditors’ committee). 
 70 Id. § 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 71 Id. 
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United States trustee deems appropriate.”72 Thus, the United States Trustee is 
not obligated to appoint multiple creditors’ committees even if creditors 
request that a committee be formed. 
Section 1102(b)(1) of the Code describes which unsecured creditors the 
United States Trustee can appoint to the creditors’ committees.73 Section 
1102(b)(1) states, 
A committee of creditors . . . shall ordinarily consist of the persons, 
willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor 
of the kinds represented by the committee, or of the members of a 
committee organized by creditors before the commencement of the 
case under this chapter, if such committee was fairly chosen and is 
representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented.74 
Because of the Code’s use of the term “ordinarily,” courts have held that the 
requirement that creditors on the committee hold the seven largest claims is 
permissive rather than mandatory.75 The legislative history of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1102(b)(1) also suggests that the language of this provision is not intended to 
be binding on the United States Trustee.76 Specifically, the legislative history 
of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) indicates that the language of this provision is 
aspirational rather than mandatory, immutable, or binding.77 Thus, in some 
cases, the United States Trustee has appointed creditors other than the seven 
largest claimholders to creditors’ committees.78 Such considerations are 
relevant in evaluating tort claimants’ ability to form creditors’ committees 
because bankruptcy cases usually involve several unsecured creditors and 
many of these creditors could have claims that greatly exceed the claims of tort 
claimants.79 
 
 72 Id. (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. § 1102(b)(1). 
 74 Id. (emphasis added). 
 75 See Kenneth N. Klee and K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committee Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1005 & n.34 (1993). 
 76 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6357. 
 77 Id. (describing the statute’s text as “precatory”). 
 78 See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating creditors’ 
committee in the case consisted of nineteen members). See generally SALLY S. NEELY, Official Committees in 
Chapter 11, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 33, 58 (2011). 
 79 See Carlos J. Cuevas, Due Process and Adequate Representation in a Chapter 11 Case: The 
Appointment and Removal of Members of a Creditors’ Committee in a Reorganization, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
333, 334 (1989) (“The claims of unsecured creditors may range from ten dollars to millions of dollars.”). 
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Section 1102(a)(2) grants bankruptcy courts the authority to review 
whether the United States Trustee has appointed enough creditors’ committees 
to represent the various creditors’ interests in the case.80 The touchstone in the 
statute for evaluating whether to form an additional creditors’ committee is 
whether creditors are adequately represented.81 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) states 
that the court can “order the appointment of additional committees of 
creditors . . . if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors.”82 
The creditor making the request has the burden of proving inadequate 
representation.83 
Proving inadequate representation is a high standard. Courts view the 
appointment of an additional creditors’ committee to be an extraordinary 
remedy.84 In fact, the mere presence of conflict among committee members 
does not show a lack of adequate representation unless the committee is also 
unable to function or if its members have breached their fiduciary duties to 
each other.85 Even if a party can show a lack of adequate representation, courts 
have discretion to choose whether to appoint an additional creditors’ 
committee, and that finding will be binding unless clearly erroneous.86 Courts 
interpret 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) as giving them discretion because the 
language of § 1102(a)(2) is not mandatory.87 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) states that 
courts “may order the appointment of additional committees of creditors” 
rather than courts “must,” “shall,” or “are required to” order the appointment 
of additional creditors’ committees.88 
 
 80 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (stating the court may order the United States Trustee to appoint 
additional creditors committees). 
 81 See id. 
 82 Id. (emphasis added). 
 83 Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 84 In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The appointment of an additional 
committee under section 1102(a)(2) is ‘extraordinary relief’”); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 778 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (stating courts have been reluctant to appoint an additional creditors’ committee 
because it is an extraordinary remedy). 
 85 See, e.g., Dana Corp., 344 B.R. at 38–39; In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 861 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 86 Albero, 68 B.R. at 157. 
 87 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 142–43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d on other 
grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 88 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1127, 1585 (10th ed. 
2014) (defining “may” as “to be a possibility” and “shall” as “has a duty to”). 
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Nevertheless, courts have appointed multiple creditors’ committees when 
such committees are needed in a particular case.89 Courts have appointed 
additional creditors’ committees to represent employees, property holders, 
priority creditors, subordinated note holders, retirees, and industry 
competitors.90 This Comment will now move on to show why tort creditors 
need their own creditors’ committee. 
II. FORMING CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES FOR TORT CLAIMANTS 
The remainder of this Comment will show that forming creditors’ 
committees is (1) needed for public policy reasons; (2) necessary to guarantee 
tort claimants’ due process rights; (3) possible given the standards that courts 
have adopted in evaluating whether to form a creditors’ committee; and (4) 
practically important. 
A. Policy Reasons 
Public policy dictates why courts should order the creation of creditors’ 
committees for tort claimants in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. More so than any 
other creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, tort claimants have been brought 
into this forum involuntarily. Tort claimants do “not elect to work for, do 
business with, or purchase the securities of,” a corporate debtor.91 In fact, tort 
claimants do not choose to be injured at all.92 
Tort claimants are also dissimilar from other creditors because tort 
claimants do not have the ability to protect their interests in the same ways that 
other creditors do.93 Prior to entering into a transaction with a corporation, 
trade creditors can bargain with a corporation to protect themselves.94 These 
 
 89 E.g., Van Arsdale v. Clemo (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 65 B.R. 160 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van 
Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987).  
 90 E.g., In re Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 88 B.R. 895 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (retirees); In re Texaco, Inc., 73 B.R. 
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (industry competitors); Van Arsdale, 65 B.R. 160 (tort claimants); In re Mesta Mach. 
Co., 67 B.R. 151, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (employees); In re Nat’l Equip. & Mold Corp., 60 B.R. 133 (N.D. Ohio 
1986) (priority creditors); In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 10 B.R 90 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (subordinated note 
holders); In re Cloud Nine, Ltd., 3 B.R. 202 (D.N.M. 1980) (property holders); Peter C. Blain & Diane 
Harrison O’Gawa, Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, 
Composition, Powers, and Duties, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 592 & n.73–83 (1990). 
 91 See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1171.01 (describing tort claimants as “involuntary 
creditors”). 
 92 See Lyle, supra note 66, at 1304. 
 93 See id. at 1305. 
 94 See id. 
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creditors can demand a high interest rate or may ask for a security interest in 
the debtor’s assets.95 However, tort claimants cannot anticipate that they will 
have claims against the corporation so they cannot make such arrangements to 
protect their interests.96 Moreover, after they are injured and before they have 
received a judgment in their favor, tort claimants often have nothing to offer 
the corporation in exchange for more favorable terms of repayment.97 
The tort claimants in the MMA, General Motors, and Chrysler bankruptcy 
cases illustrate these problems. In the MMA bankruptcy case, some of the tort 
claimants included individuals “who happened to be in a small town café when 
it, and they, were incinerated by the Debtor’s runaway train.”98 Other tort 
claimants in the MMA bankruptcy case include property owners who 
helplessly watched while their homes and businesses were engulfed by fires 
nearly twelve stories high.99 Other tort claimants suffered severe property 
damage when the train crashed into the town spilling 1.5 million gallons of 
oil.100 Similarly, in the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcy cases, the tort 
claimants were individuals who involuntarily experienced devastating injuries 
as a result of unknown defects in vehicles that Chrysler and General Motors 
manufactured.101 Yet, all of these tort claimants were automatically lumped 
into the class of unsecured creditors under the authority of the Code.102 
To make matters worse, unlike commercial creditors, tort claimants may 
not make up a sophisticated or economically stable group.103 In fact, tort 
claimants may not be familiar with the Bankruptcy Code or with how to 
protect themselves in a bankruptcy proceeding.104 For example, in the General 
Motors and Chrysler bankruptcy cases, the tort claimants included individuals 
 
 95 See id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203 (1978)). 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. 
 98 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 3. 
 99 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 12–13; McLaughlin, Tomesco 
& Kary, supra note 8. 
 100 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 1, 12–13; McLaughlin, 
Tomesco & Kary, supra note 8. 
 101 See Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5; Chrysler Motion for Appointment, 
supra note 16, at 5. 
 102 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 1, 3; Gen. Motors Motion for 
Appointment, supra note 18, at 4; Chrysler Motion for Appointment, supra note 16, at 4. 
 103 See, e.g., Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 
3 (stating tort claimants are unsophisticated); Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5 
(stating tort claimants are economically fragile). 
 104 See, e.g., Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 
3 (stating tort claimants are not familiar with American bankruptcy law). 
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who resided throughout the country and who struggled to find individual 
representation to assert their claims.105 Similarly, in the MMA bankruptcy 
case, the tort claimants include injured victims or family members representing 
the estates of individuals killed in the crash.106 Moreover, these individuals 
reside in Canada, are not familiar with American bankruptcy law, and may not 
even speak English.107 Nevertheless, tort claimants like the MMA accident 
victims will be treated like other unsecured creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Some commentators have suggested that the Code’s drafters did not 
anticipate that tort claims would frequently appear in the bankruptcy forum or 
that debtors’ would use bankruptcy as a means to dealing with mass tort 
liability.108 The thrust of this argument is that the Code was designed primarily 
to operate in the context of commercial contractual relationships.109 According 
to this argument, we can see evidence of this limited design in the fact that the 
Code refers to the parties in a bankruptcy proceeding exclusively as creditors 
and debtors and can be used to advance business interests over equitable 
goals.110 However, since 1982 with the bankruptcies of several asbestos 
manufacturers, companies facing mass tort liability have increasingly filed for 
bankruptcy.111 
To overcome the shortsightedness of the Code and to more generally 
protect tort claimants, creditors’ committees of tort claimants need to be 
formed. 
B. Due Process Considerations 
Due process considerations also suggest that creditors’ committees of tort 
claimants are needed in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of corporate debtors. Due 
process provides that the government cannot deprive an individual of life, 
 
 105 See Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 2, 5; Chrysler Motion for Appointment, 
supra note 16, at 5. 
 106 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Withdrawal of their Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committees at 1, 
4–5, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Sept. 27, 2013), ECF No. 291. 
 107 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 3. 
 108 See Lyle, supra note 66, at 1304. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. 
 111 S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY 
CASES 1 (2005), available at http://www2.fjc.gov/content/judicial-management-mass-tort-bankruptcy-cases-0. 
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liberty, or property without notice and the opportunity to be heard.112 By 
comparing class action suits and chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, this Comment 
will show that tort claimants may be deprived of due process when courts fail 
to order the United States Trustee to form creditors’ committees for tort 
claimants. 
1. Comparison of Class Action Suits and Chapter 11 Bankruptcies 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies are similar to class action suits in a variety of 
ways.113 A chapter 11 bankruptcy involves a group of unsecured creditors 
whom the debtor has harmed by failing to repay its debts or, as in the case of 
tort claimants, by physically injuring them.114 Similarly, a class action suit 
involves several injured parties.115 In a class action suit, the court authorizes a 
representative to litigate on behalf of a class of absent persons; whereas, in a 
chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the court or the United States Trustee form a 
creditors’ committee to represent the interests of the debtor’s unsecured 
creditors.116 Like the actions of a creditors’ committee, the actions of a class 
representative can significantly impact the members that she represents—
potentially affecting their ability to recover against the defendant.117 
2. Adequate Representation Standard in Class Action Suits 
Since class members will be bound by the outcome of a class action law 
suit, due process requires that the class representative adequately represent 
their interests. Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodies 
this requirement, listing the requirements that must be met before a court may 
certify a class action suit.118 Like the bankruptcy standard for forming a 
 
 112 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 
F.3d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in Bankruptcy: 
Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
329, 335 (1996). 
 113 See Cuevas, supra note 79, at 336. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See id. 
 116 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1), (3) (2012) (describing the responsibilities of committee members in 
bankruptcy), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (describing the requirements of class representatives in class actions). 
 117 See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 
§ 1765 (3d ed. 2014) (“If the absent members are to be conclusively bound by the result of an action 
prosecuted or defended by a party alleged to represent their interests, basic notions of fairness and justice 
demand that the representation they receive be adequate.”). 
 118 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (providing additional requirements that must be 
met before a court can certify a class action suit). 
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creditors’ committee, Rule 23(a) establishes that any class representative needs 
to “fairly and adequately” represent the needs of the class.119 Rule 23(a) 
requires adequate representation to ensure that class members receive due 
process in class action suits.120 Due process is a concern in class action suits 
because judgments in class action suits can bind the members of the class 
regardless of whether the judgments are favorable or whether the class 
members are present during the proceedings.121 
The requirement of adequate representation imposes two limitations.122 
Adequate representation necessitates: (1) that the interests of the class 
representative not impermissibly conflict with those of the class he or she 
seeks to represent and (2) that the class counsel be competent.123 In applying 
the requirement of adequate representation, courts focus on whether the 
proposed class representative’s interests are antagonistic to the interests of the 
class that he or she seeks to represent.124 
Courts have consistently found a lack of adequate representation when the 
economic interests of the proposed class representative conflict with the 
members of the class that she seeks to represent.125 Bieneman v. City of 
Chicago is illustrative of how class members’ conflicting interests can destroy 
class certification.126 In that case, a homeowner sought to bring a class action 
suit on behalf of all landowners in the vicinity of an airport.127 The homeowner 
claimed that the airport owner had harmed the class members by expanding the 
airport facilities in an area close to their properties.128 Although the airport 
expansion might cause the value of residential homes to decrease, the court 
pointed out that other property owners would “undoubtedly derive great 
benefit” from the expansion.129 Specifically, the court proposed that business 
 
 119 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”), with 11 
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (“assure adequate representation of creditors”). 
 120 See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, at § 1768. 
 121 See id. at § 1765. 
 122 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
 123 Id. 
 124 See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, at § 1768. 
 125 See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 
23(a)(4) . . . preclude[s] class certification where the economic interests and objectives of the named 
representatives differ significantly from the economic interests and objectives of unnamed class members.”). 
 126 864 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 465. 
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owners would enjoy more business from increased airport operations.130 
Because of their different economic interests, the court declined to certify the 
class.131 This case demonstrates that a court cannot certify a class action suit if 
the representative’s interests conflict with those of some of the proposed class 
members. 
3. Applying the Rules from Class Action Suits 
The rules for class action suits provide strong support for the appointment 
of committees of tort claimants because tort claimants’ financial interest often 
conflict with other creditors’ financial interests.132 In bankruptcy cases, tort 
claimants generally have the same priority as other unsecured creditors, 
meaning that the debtor is not required to satisfy tort claims before it pays 
other unsecured creditors.133 Tort creditors and other unsecured creditors 
would typically be paid the same pro rata share of their claims in a chapter 7 
liquidation, and therefore they would be eligible for the same baseline 
repayment in a chapter 11 reorganization.134 Although their claims are of equal 
priority, tort claimants’ interests may be at odds with other creditors’ interests 
because tort claimants may prefer immediate relief. Faced with high medical 
bills or other expenses, tort claimants and their families may prefer liquidation 
of the debtor’s assets rather than reorganization of the debtor so that they can 
obtain prompt payment of their claims. This preference may conflict with trade 
creditors’ interests because a debtor’s trade creditors are often interested in 
“having a reorganized company around to sell goods and services to at a later 
date.”135 
Even if trade creditors also want the debtor to sell its assets, trade creditors’ 
interests may not be well-aligned with tort claimants’ interests. A purchaser 
may be incentivized to satisfy the debts that a debtor owes to trade creditors 
because a purchaser may need to do business with those trade creditors once it 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 6. 
 133 The one counter-example is the priority treatment of personal injury and wrongful death claims against 
railroads. 11 U.S.C. § 1171 (2012) (granting that these claims will be paid as an administrative expense of the 
estate). 
 134 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2), (b) (requiring a chapter 7 debtor to repay unsecured creditors on the 
same pro rata basis), with id. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (requiring chapter 11 debtors repay holders of unsecured claims 
at least what they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation if the class votes against the plan of 
reorganization).  
 135 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing In re Altair Airlines, 
727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984)), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
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has assumed the debtor’s property. However, a purchaser will not need to work 
with tort claimants so it will not have a similar incentive to assume a debtor’s 
tort liability. 
Moreover, unlike most creditors, tort victims’ claims may in part be 
covered by insurance.136 However, the availability of such insurance funds is 
often not sufficient to fully compensate tort claimants for their injuries. 
Consider the MMA bankruptcy case. MMA had an insurance policy of $25 
million, which covered costs related to bodily injury, property damage, and 
pollution.137 Yet, the costs to clean up the oil spilled are estimated to be $193 
million alone.138 Although insurance proceeds are often insufficient to cover 
tort victims’ claims, the availability of such funds could be used to justify 
paying tort victims less on a pro rata basis than other unsecured creditors. 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b) provides that a court can confirm the terms of a debtor’s 
reorganization plan as long as the plan does not unfairly discriminate against 
some creditors. Arguably, a court may think that a plan providing for a smaller 
payout to tort claimants does not unfairly discriminate against them because 
they have access to funds outside of the plan. 
Tort claimants may also be entitled to additional post-confirmation relief.139 
28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) provides that the Code “do[es] not affect any right to trial 
by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard 
to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.”140 Because tort claimants 
have the ability to sue debtors after bankruptcy proceedings are concluded, tort 
claimants may be interested in setting up a trust or other device that will be 
used to pay any judgments that they receive in post-confirmation litigation. 
Other creditors will not be interested in providing for these mechanisms unless 
they also have the ability to sue the debtor post-confirmation. Setting up a trust 
 
 136 See Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55–56 (5th Cir. 1993). Many states allow a 
tort creditor of a bankrupt estate to substitute itself as the beneficiary of a plan of insurance held by the debtor 
to cover their claims under direct action statutes. Giroux v. Purington Bldg. Sys., Inc., 670 A.2d 1227, 1229 
(R.I. 1996) (discussing a Rhode Island statute that allowed a wrongful death plaintiff to substitute for the 
insured on the insurance policy when the insured had filed for bankruptcy, and allowing the plaintiff to recover 
from the insurer to the policy limits). However, insurance policies are typically property of the estate, and if 
insurance proceeds become part of the estate, they are eligible for pro rata distribution to all unsecured 
creditors. In re Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 580 F. App’x 82, 84–87 (2014).  
 137 Richard Summerfield, Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway Files for Bankruptcy Protection, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, Oct. 2013, available at http://www.financierworldwide.com/montreal-maine-and-
atlantic-railway-files-for-bankruptcy-protection/#.VSWt9_nF_IY. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See 28 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2012). 
 140 See id. 
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will also be against their interests because doing so will decrease the amount of 
money that can be paid to all other creditors. Thus, tort claimants need a means 
to voice their individual interests. 
If a court does not appoint a committee for tort claimants, tort claimants do 
not have meaningful ways to participate in the proceedings. Consider tort 
claimants’ ability to vote on a debtor’s reorganization plan. Like all other 
creditors, tort claimants have the right to vote on a debtor’s reorganization 
plan.141 If the creditors reject the plan, the court may not be able to confirm the 
debtor’s reorganization plan.142 Creditors vote on the plan in classes or 
groups.143 However, as part of the plan process, the debtor is responsible for 
arranging creditors into these classes. The debtor could use this power to put 
tort claimants in a class dominated by other creditors who favor the plan.144 If 
tort claimants are outnumbered, they might not be able to effectively oppose a 
plan that goes against their best interests. Furthermore, it is possible that such a 
plan could be confirmed because a plan can be confirmed over the opposition 
of some creditors if the plan meets other requirements.145 
The Code protects creditors’ rights by giving them the right to appear and 
raise any concern in a bankruptcy case.146 Because tort claimants are often 
economically fragile and unfamiliar with the Code, tort claimants may not be 
able to take advantage of this opportunity.147 Additionally, the Code provides 
that the debtor must provide notice to those parties “who are likely to have the 
most interest in a particular type of proceeding in the typical case, and who are 
most likely to care about participation.”148 However, merely providing notice 
to tort claimants does not guarantee due process because the right to notice has 
little value if tort claimants do not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
Thus, the existing avenues for participating in a bankruptcy case do not 
provide a robust form of due process for tort claimants. However, because 
 
 141 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–502, 1126(a) (2012). 
 142 See id. § 1129(a)(7)–(8). 
 143 See id. §§ 1123(a)(1)–(4), 1126. 
 144 See id. § 1123(a)(1)–(4). 
 145 See id. § 1129(b) (describing the requirements of cramdown, which permits confirmation of a 
reorganization plan despite creditor opposition). 
 146 Id. § 1109(b). 
 147 See, e.g., Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 
3 (stating tort claimants are not familiar with American bankruptcy law); Gen. Motors Motion for 
Appointment, supra note 18, at 5 (stating tort claimants are economically fragile). 
 148 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1109.06 (“[T]he rules balance the importance of 
notice against the costs of notice, recognizing that notice of every proceeding to every party in interest in every 
case would often be a waste of time and resources.”).  
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“bankruptcy relief is powerful medicine, often resulting in the profound 
alteration . . . of a host of otherwise valid legal obligations,”149 the Code should 
provide tort claimants a robust form of due process. 
Thus, courts should form creditors’ committees to ensure that tort claimants 
enjoy due process. 
C. Consistent with Case Law Interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) 
In addition to the public policy and due process reasons for appointing an 
additional creditors’ committee to represent tort claimants, case law 
interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) also supports this proposal. Although 
§ 1102(a)(2) does not provide a framework for evaluating whether an 
additional creditors’ committee is warranted, courts have identified certain 
factors to consider in evaluating whether creditors are adequately represented 
by existing committees.150 Courts most commonly cite the following factors: 
(1) the nature of the case; (2) the ability of the committee to function; (3) the 
potential for added cost and the timeliness of the motion; and (4) the desires of 
the constituencies.151 These factors weigh strongly in favor of forming a 
creditors’ committee of tort claimants when a corporate debtor files for relief 
under chapter 11 of the Code. 
1. Nature of the Case 
In enacting 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2), Congress recognized that in bankruptcy 
cases involving several types of creditors or equity holders a single creditors’ 
committee could not adequately represent the interests of all the creditors in 
the case.152 Congress stated that courts are authorized to use § 1102(a)(2) to 
create additional creditors’ committees when “the debtor proposes to affect 
several classes of debt or equity holders.”153 Therefore, some courts have 
found the size of the proceeding, whether it includes several classes of debt or 
 
 149 Id. ¶ 1109.02[3b].  
 150 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 
212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Hill Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re McLean 
Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 151 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 141; Hill Stores Co., 137 B.R. at 5–6; McLean Indus., Inc., 70 
B.R. at 860-61; Albero, 68 B.R. at 159. 
 152 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 142; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6357. 
 153 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 401, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357. 
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equity holders, to be particularly significant in determining whether additional 
creditors’ committees are warranted.154 
For example, in In re Beker Industries Corp., the court ordered the United 
States Trustee to appoint an additional creditors’ committee of stock and 
debenture holders in part because the case was large and complex.155 The case 
involved several creditor groups, including numerous public utility entities and 
debenture holders, as well as equity holders, namely common and preferred 
stockholders.156 The court explained that additional creditors’ committees are 
warranted in a large bankruptcy case, in which there are several groups of debt 
and equity holders, because “committees should be composed of creditors . . . 
representative of classes as a whole as opposed to dissident factions of 
particular classes.”157 
Additionally, the court explained that multiple creditors’ committees are 
warranted in large bankruptcy proceedings because creditors have to take an 
active role in such cases to protect their interests.158 The court stated that 
creditors will have to take an active role in large bankruptcy proceedings to 
protect their interests because “[a] large case brings with it . . . a complex 
business requiring significant post-petition financing and a heavily negotiated 
plan.”159 
In the bankruptcies of corporate debtors, the case will often be large and 
complex affecting several types of creditors. For example, the MMA 
bankruptcy case is exceedingly large and complex because it has affected 
hundreds of different unsecured creditors.160 These unsecured creditors include 
railroad equipment vendors, a public utility company, insurance companies, 
and financial institutions in addition to the tort claimants.161 Given the law on 
 
 154 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 144 (“The Court finds that the case is large and complex and is 
the type that can justify additional committees.”); In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc., 96 B.R. 779, 781 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (“[T]he size and complexity of debtor’s bankruptcy’s proceedings weigh in favor of 
the appointment of an additional committee.”); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55 B.R. 945, 948–49 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The complex nature of this large case requires representation . . . .”). But see In re Dana 
Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating size of the bankruptcy case is not determinative of 
whether additional creditors’ committees are warranted). 
 155 See 55 B.R. at 949. 
 156 Id. at 947. 
 157 Id. at 948–49 (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1102.2 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1984)). 
 158 See id. at 949. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 10. 
 161 See id. 
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point, which suggests that additional creditors’ committees are needed when a 
case affects several types of debt or equity holders, courts should order the 
United States Trustee to appoint additional committees for tort claimants in the 
bankruptcies of corporate debtors such as MMA. 
2. Ability of the Committee to Function 
In addition to the nature of the bankruptcy case, courts commonly consider 
the ability of the committee to function to determine if an additional committee 
is appropriate.162 In evaluating a committee’s ability to function, courts 
examine whether the existing committee is able to reach a consensus on the 
issues that require the committee’s approval and whether creditors have a 
meaningful voice on the committee.163 If an existing committee is “hopelessly 
divided, unable to take a position on important matters and ineffective,” then a 
court is more likely to hold that an additional committee is needed.164 
However, as the court in In re Dow Corning Corp. explained, the analysis 
should not end there.165 
In evaluating whether creditors are adequately represented on the creditors’ 
committee, courts should assess whether a creditor group has a meaningful 
voice on the committee.166 In In re Dow Corning Corp., the court looked 
beyond the committee’s ability to function in evaluating whether an additional 
creditors’ committee is warranted.167 The court explained that creditors may 
not be adequately represented even if the existing committee is able to function 
and to reach a consensus on all the important issues before it.168 The problem is 
that a creditors’ committee may be “so dominated by one group of creditors 
that a separate group has virtually no say in the decision-making process.”169 
Instead, the court stated that courts need to evaluate whether the creditors in 
 
 162 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 671, 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Hills Stores Co., 137 
B.R. 4, 5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 779 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding 
that the conflict among committee members did not prevent adequate representation). 
 163 See Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 686; In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 164 Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 686. 
 165 See 194 B.R. at 142. 
 166 See id. at 141–42; see also Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 693 (denying to form an additional creditors’ 
committee when the creditors’ concerns had been heard through the existing creditors’ committee). 
 167 See 194 B.R. at 142. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. 
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the case have “a meaningful voice” on the existing committee or whether 
particular creditors are “effectively disenfranchised.”170 
When courts fail to form creditors’ committees exclusively for tort 
claimants, tort claimants can become effectively disenfranchised. Two 
bankruptcies in particular, In re Chrysler and In re General Motors, illustrate 
this problem. In In re Chrysler, tort claimants were appointed to an official 
creditors’ committee.171 However, other unsecured creditors made up most of 
the creditors’ committee.172 These other unsecured creditors were interested in 
selling Chrysler’s assets free and clear of tort claims to Chrysler’s successor 
because their own claims would be satisfied through the sale transaction.173 
Because these other unsecured creditors dominated the creditors’ committee 
and supported the sale, tort claimants were unable to oppose the sale and 
received nothing because the sales price was insufficient to repay all of the 
creditors.174 
Similarly, in In re General Motors, the court did not form a creditors’ 
committee to represent tort claimants and the debtor sold its assets free and 
clear of tort claims.175 Like in In re Chrysler, the other unsecured creditors 
supported a sale free and clear of General Motors’ tort claims176—their own 
interests being satisfied through the sale.177 General Motors’ successor offered 
unsecured bondholders an ownership in the new General Motors company.178 
For other unsecured creditors, General Motors’ successor offered to assume the 
contracts that the creditors had made with the old General Motors for supplies 
and dealerships.179 However, if the court had appointed a separate committee 
of tort claimants, tort claimants’ voices would not have been drowned out by 
 
 170 See id. at 141–42. 
 171 Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See Chrysler Order Authorizing Sale, supra note 21; see also Master Transaction Agreement, supra 
note 21. 
 174 See supra note 22. 
 175 See ‘New’ GM Agrees to Assume Future Liability Claims of ‘Old’ GM Products, supra note 23. 
 176 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 177 Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 4. 
 178 See Kendra Marr, GM Bondholders Vote on Sweetened Deal, WASH. POST, May 31, 2009, at A14 
(describing the deal between the U.S. Treasury and GM’s bondholders to grant them an ownership stake in 
“New GM” in return for their support of GM’s § 363 sale); David Welch, Old GM Bondholders Getting 
Shares in New GM May Depress Price, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 7, 2011 12:01AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-06/old-gm-bondholders-getting-shares-in-new-general-motors-may-
depress-price (discussing the release of New GM stock to former bondholders of Old GM). 
 179 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 483 (“Substantially all of old GM’s executory contracts with direct 
suppliers are likely to be assumed and assigned to New GM.”). 
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other creditors on the committee with dissimilar interests. With their own 
voice, tort claimants may be more successful in negotiating with the debtor and 
purchaser for a higher sales price or for a sale in which the purchaser assumes 
the debtor’s tort liability. 
3. Timing and Added Cost 
In deciding whether to order the United States Trustee to appoint additional 
creditors’ committees, courts also consider the added cost associated with 
forming the committees and the timing of a party’s motion.180 These factors are 
balanced against whether the creditors’ committee adequately represents the 
creditors in the proceeding.181 These discretionary factors should not prevent 
the appointment of a separate committee if it is otherwise justified by a 
concern for adequate representation.182 
a. Timing of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) Motion 
Parties need to promptly file a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) to 
form a creditors’ committee.183 In In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 
the court denied the creditor group’s motion to form an additional creditors’ 
committee because the motion was not timely filed.184 The creditor group filed 
their motion for formation of an additional creditors’ committee four months 
after the United States Trustee had appointed a single creditors’ committee.185 
 
 180 See generally Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 671 (“Discretionary considerations include: 1. The cost 
associated with the appointment; 2. The time of the application; 3. The potential for added complexity; and 4. 
The presence of other avenues for creditor participation.”). 
 181 See generally id. (“[T]he court must determine whether the appointment of an additional committee is 
necessary to assure the movants are adequately represented. . . . [I]f the answer to the first question is yes, then 
the court must decide whether it should exercise its discretion and order the appointment.”). 
 182 See, e.g., In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing In re McLean Indus., 
Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (stating the potential added cost is not sufficient in itself to 
deprive the creditors of the formation of an additional committee if one is otherwise appropriate); In re 
Texaco, Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[A] price tag should not be placed on adequate 
representation.”) (holding that a separate committee for unsecured oil and gas creditors was no longer required 
to adequately represent their interests). 
 183 See Ad Hoc Bondholders Grp. v. Interco Inc. (In re Interco Inc.), 141 B.R. 422, 424–25 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1992); Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. at 7–8; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 211 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 89 B.R. 1014, 1020 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); Albero v. 
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Van Arsdale v. Clemo 
(In re A.H. Robins Co.), 65 B.R. 160, 162 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 
794 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a party’s motion was not promptly filed when it filed a motion to dissolve 
the committee of tort claimants seven weeks after the United States Trustee selected the committee). 
 184 89 B.R. at 1020. 
 185 Id. at 1016–17. 
MCCARTHY GALLEYSPROOFS 7/9/2015  1:00 PM 
2015] CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES 457 
The court found it significant that the case was far along in the proceeding and 
that the formation of an additional creditors’ committee would delay and 
disrupt the conclusion of the proceeding.186 
Similarly, in In re Johns-Manville, the court affirmed the lower court’s 
denial of a motion to form an additional creditors’ committee.187 The court 
explained that the creditors had waited too long because the debtor was in its 
final stages of reorganization.188 At this point, the court believed that it would 
be “too late for a committee to exercise its most important function—
negotiating a reorganization plan—as a reorganization plan ha[d] already been 
submitted to the bankruptcy court.”189 
While these examples demonstrate the consequences of submitting an 
untimely motion for an additional creditors’ committee, tort claimants have 
typically filed timely motions.190 Therefore, timing concerns generally should 
not come into play in a court’s deliberation about whether to order the United 
States Trustee to appoint a creditors’ committee for tort claimants. 
b. Added Cost 
Opponents of forming additional creditors’ committees often focus on the 
fact that additional creditors’ committees entail additional expenses for the 
bankruptcy estate.191 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) authorizes creditors’ committees to 
hire professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, at the expense of the 
bankruptcy estate.192 Moreover, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(F), the 
 
 186 Id. at 1020. 
 187 68 B.R. at 165. 
 188 Id. at 163. 
 189 Id. 
 190 For example, in In re General Motors and In re Chrysler, tort claimants filed their motions to form 
additional creditors’ committees within a few days of the debtors’ bankruptcy filings. Chrysler LLC filed a 
voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Code on April 30, 2009. The tort claimants in this case 
filed a motion requesting the court to form an additional creditors’ committee on May 4, 2009. Chrysler 
Motion for Appointment, supra note 16, at 1, 7. Likewise, General Motors filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under chapter 11 on June 1, 2009. On June 2, 2009, its tort claimants filed a motion requesting the court to 
form an additional creditors’ committee of tort claimants. Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 
18, at 1, 6. 
 191 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 
212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55 B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 192 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012). The provision states,  
At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, at which a 
majority of the members of such committee are present, and with the court’s approval, such 
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bankruptcy estate may be required to compensate members of creditors’ 
committees for out-of-pocket expenses.193 These expenses and fees are in part 
what cause the bankruptcy estate to incur additional costs when the court or the 
United States Trustee appoint an additional creditors’ committee.194 
While courts should review added costs, courts can minimize these costs so 
as to provide for additional creditors’ committees.195 Courts can minimize 
professional expenses because a committee’s employment of professionals is 
ultimately subject to court approval.196 The Bankruptcy Rules, which govern 
procedures for bankruptcy proceedings, provide the application that creditors’ 
committees should use in requesting the court’s approval to hire 
professionals.197 This application requires creditors to state the specific need 
for hiring a professional, the professional’s name, the reasons for selecting the 
particular professional, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed 
arrangements for compensation, and any connections that the professional 
might have with the debtor.198 Even if a court allows a creditors’ committee to 
hire professionals, a court does not have to compensate these professionals if 
the professionals’ fees are unreasonable or duplicative.199 
Courts have exercised their power to restrict the hiring of lawyers, 
accountants, and other professionals by creditors’ committees.200 In In re 
Cumberland Farms, Inc., the court held that a separately appointed creditors’ 
 
committee may select and authorize the employment by such committee of one or more 
attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee. 
Id. 
 193 See id. § 503(b) (“After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses . . . (3) 
[for] the actual, necessary expenses . . . incurred by . . . (F) a member of a committee appointed under section 
1102 of this title, if such expenses are incurred in the performance of the duties of such committee . . . .”). 
 194 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 143; Beker Indus. Corp., 55 B.R. at 949. 
 195 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 143; In re Cumberland Farms, Inc. 142 B.R. 593, 594–96 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 1992) (denying the committee’s request to hire counsel at the expense of the estate); In re Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 118 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating in dicta that the court could 
control the costs of creating separate committees by ordering the committees to share accountants); Blain & 
O’Gawa, supra note 98, at 596. 
 196 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (“[W]ith the court’s approval, . . . committee[s] may select and authorize the 
employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform 
services for such committee[s].”); Blain & O’Gawa, supra note 90, at 596. 
 197 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a). 
 198 Id. 
 199 See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (stating the court may award “reasonable” compensation and that 
the court may award less than the amount of compensation requested by the professional). 
 200 See Cumberland Farms, Inc., 142 B.R. at 595–96; Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 118 B.R. at 
211. 
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committee of lenders was not allowed to employ legal counsel at the 
bankruptcy estate’s expense because that legal counsel’s efforts would merely 
duplicate services provided by the unsecured creditors’ committee.201 
Similarly, in In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., the court noted that 
in previous cases, courts have “required separate committees to share 
accountants” out of concern for costs.202 In addition to limiting the hiring of 
professionals, the court in In re Beker Industries suggested that courts can 
require the various creditors’ committees to “determine their joint interests and 
address them jointly[, take] steps to minimize duplication,” and monitor costly 
fees and other expenses.203 
Given these considerations, concerns about additional costs should not 
prevent a court from ordering the United States Trustee to appoint a creditors’ 
committee for tort claimants. 
4. Desires of the Constituencies 
In chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of corporate debtors, tort claimants have 
widely supported the formation of additional creditors’ committees to represent 
them. For example, in the MMA bankruptcy case, the train crash killed forty-
seven people.204 Of the decedents, thirty-three of their estates supported the 
motion requesting the court to form an additional creditors’ committee.205 
Moreover, the Canadian government representatives and the pending class-
action claimants also wanted the court to form a creditors’ committee to 
represent tort claimants.206 
Thus, the case law supports forming creditors’ committees of tort claimants 
in bankruptcies of corporate debtors. 
D. Practical Significance 
This Comment does not claim that forming creditors’ committees for tort 
claimants will guarantee tort claimants will always be successful in achieving 
all of their objectives. However, as the MMA bankruptcy case illustrates, tort 
claimants may be better off if such committees are formed. 
 
 201 142 B.R. at 595–96. 
 202 118 B.R. at 211. 
 203 55 B.R. 945, 951 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 204 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 5. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 1. 
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In the MMA bankruptcy case, the court reached the right result. On 
October 18, 2013, the court ordered the United States Trustee to appoint a 
creditors’ committee for victims of the accident.207 In doing so, the court 
explained that a creditors’ committee of victims was needed “[to] give official 
standing and [a] voice to victims who may be without one in these 
proceedings” and to “give the trustee and other parties a point of contact and 
[a] negotiating partner on a plan and any other issue in the case.”208 
Once formed, the committee of tort claimants embraced the powers that the 
Code affords creditors’ committees.209 On January 8, 2014, the committee filed 
a motion requesting the court’s approval to let the committee hire legal counsel 
to represent the committee’s interests in the case.210 After the court granted the 
committee’s request,211 the committee’s hired counsel filed a motion 
requesting that the court require the debtor and other parties to sit down and 
discuss specific issues surrounding the case.212 
Despite the successes, there have been some setbacks in the case from the 
tort claimants’ perspective. The court issued an order approving the sale of 
MMA’s assets free and clear of liens, claims, and interests to Railroad 
Acquisitions Holdings, LLC.213 The order states that the term “liens, claims, 
and interests,” includes any claims arising from tort claims and specifies that 
the purchaser will only be responsible for certain “Assumed Liabilities.”214 
Tort claims were not part of the Assumed Liabilities so Railroad Acquisitions 
Holdings, LLC will not assume responsibility for paying the tort claimants.215 
 
 207 Order Authorizing the Appointment of a Victims’ Committee at 4, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., 
Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Oct. 18, 2013) ECF No. 391. 
 208 Id. at 3. 
 209 See, e.g., Application for Order, Pursuant to Sections 328, 330, & 1103 of Bankruptcy Code, 
Authorizing Employment and Retention of Paul Hastings LLP as Counsel to Official Committee of Victims, In 
re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Jan. 8, 2014), ECF No. 559. 
 210 Id. at 1. 
 211 Order Authorizing Employment and Retention of Paul Hastings LLP as Counsel to Official Committee 
of Victims Pursuant to Sections 328, 330, & 1103 of Bankruptcy Code, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., 
No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Feb. 11, 2014), ECF No. 647. 
 212 Motion of Official Committee of Victims Pursuant to Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol Requesting 
Joint Status Conference Before U.S. & Canadian Court at 1, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-
10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Feb. 7, 2014), ECF No. 620. 
 213 Order (I) Approving (A) Sale of Assets Pursuant to Asset Purchase Agreement with Railroad 
Acquisition Holdings LLC, (B) Sale of Assets Free & Clear of Liens, Claims, & Interests, & (C) Assumption 
& Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts & Unexpired Leases Thereto & (II) Granting Related Relief, In 
re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Jan, 24, 2014), ECF No. 594. 
 214 Id. at 15. 
 215 Id. at 9, 12. 
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The other problem is that the total purchase price is far less than the estimated 
value of the tort claims so tort claimants will receive only a portion of the 
value of their claims.216 
Although tort claimants suffered this setback, as of the writing of this 
Comment, several news outlets reported that a settlement fund had been 
drafted to repay tort claimants. According to these news outlets, MMA, its 
insurers, its founder, Edward Burkhardt, and several other entities linked to the 
derailment will contribute to a settlement fund that will then be used to repay 
tort claimants.217 The exact amount of this settlement fund has yet to be 
determined, but the Chapter 11 Trustee has indicated that he hopes to obtain as 
much as $500 million for the tort claimants.218 Importantly, there is reason to 
believe that the committee of tort claimants helped to achieve this settlement. 
Prior to the settlement, the committee of tort claimants had said that it “worked 
tirelessly with the Trustee in hopes of achieving a global settlement that would 
result in adequate compensation for the victims.”219 Thus, it is likely that the 
efforts of the committee of tort claimants in the MMA bankruptcy case 
contributed to better repayment terms for tort victims. 
CONCLUSION 
Tort claimants, like the accident victims in the MMA bankruptcy case, are 
not going to stop appearing in chapter 11 bankruptcies. In fact, scholars predict 
that tort claimants are going to appear more frequently in chapter 11 corporate 
bankruptcies given the advantages of dealing with tort claims in bankruptcy.220 
This trend is unfortunate because tort claimants are involuntary creditors. Their 
 
 216 See Darren Fishell, Assets of Bankrupt Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway Sold in Canada After 
Clearing Regulatory Approval, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 30, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/ 
2014/06/30/business/assets-of-bankrupt-montreal-maine-and-atlantic-railway-sold-in-canada-after-clearing-
regulatory-approval/ (stating MMA’s assets were sold for $15.85 million but the Quebec government has 
claims against MMA in excess of $409 million for cleanup and other costs). 
 217 See Julie Gordon, Update 1-Victims of Quebec Oil-by-Rail Disaster Agree to $200 Mln Settlement, 
REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/10/canada-train-settlement-
idUSL1N0UO2KM20150110. 
 218 See Lac-Mégantic Rail Disaster: $200M Proposed Settlement Reached, CBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2015 7:29 
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/lac-mégantic-rail-disaster-200m-proposed-settlement-reached-
1.2896250. 
 219 Motion of Official Committee of Victims Seeking Modification of Committee Appointment Order to 
Authorize Committee to Fully Participate in Wrongful Death Proceedings Pending Before Maine District 
Court at 1, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Aug, 15, 2014), ECF No. 1077. 
 220 See Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 451–52 (1998) 
(describing chapter 11 as a tool “to assist companies in bringing closure” to mass tort claims in bankruptcy). 
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relationship with the debtor stems entirely from the fact that they are owed 
money because the debtor has harmed them without their consent. 
Luckily, the Code grants courts the power to form additional creditors’ 
committees for tort claimants. In determining whether additional creditors’ 
committees are needed in a case, courts balance the following factors: (1) the 
nature of the case; (2) the ability of the existing creditors’ committee to 
function; (3) the added cost of forming an additional creditors’ committee and 
the timing of a creditor group’s motion requesting the court to form an 
additional creditors’ committee; and (4) the desires of the constituencies.221 
Balancing these factors strongly weighs in favor of forming a committee for 
tort claimants. 
Tort claimants will greatly benefit from having their own committee. The 
committee of tort claimants will be able to work directly with the debtor to 
formulate a reorganization plan or consult with the debtor about the terms of 
the sale or other matters regarding the administration of the case.222 During this 
process, tort claimants can voice their concerns about proposals that might not 
be in their best interest. Moreover, because creditors’ committees can hire legal 
counsel and other professionals,223 tort claimants will be informed about their 
legal interests, and hence, better equipped to assert their legal interests in a 
bankruptcy case. Finally, tort claimants will actually be able to voice their 
concerns if they get their own committee because their voices will not be 
drowned out by creditors who have dissimilar interests. Thus, while forming 
creditors’ committees for tort claimants will not guarantee that tort claimants 
will prevail on each of their objectives or will receive full repayment of their 
claims, forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants is important because it 
provides these victims a meaningful voice to advocate for their interests. 
Moreover, we have seen that the failure to form creditors’ committees for tort 
claimants can have disastrous results.224 Such a failure could enable corporate 
debtors to sell their property free and clear of tort claims for such a low price 
that tort claimants receive virtually nothing as evidenced in the General Motors 
 
 221 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing In re Hill 
Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860–61 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1987)), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In 
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 222 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (2012). 
 223 Id. § 1103(a). 
 224 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5 (describing tort victims as an 
“economically fragile constituency”).  
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and in the Chrysler bankruptcy cases.225 Thus, courts should always order the 
United States Trustee to form creditors’ committees for tort claimants in 
chapter 11 bankruptcies of corporate debtors. 
CORINNE MCCARTHY∗ 
 
 225 See In re General Motors, Inc., 407 B.R. 463, 473–74, 505 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); ‘New’ GM Agrees 
to Assume Future Liability Claims of ‘Old’ GM Products, supra note 23. While the law is clear in this area, it 
is not very sympathetic to tort claimants. The court in In re General Motors made this clear, stating, 
This Court fully understands the circumstances of tort victims, and the fact that if they prevail in 
litigation and cannot look to [the purchaser] as an additional source of recovery, they may 
recover only modest amounts on any allowed claims . . . . But the law in this Circuit and District 
is clear; the Court will permit [the debtor’s] assets to pass to the purchaser free and clear of 
successor liability claims. 
General Motors, Inc., 407 B.R. at 505. 
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